a priori seem to be applicable to the phenomena of morphogenesis. To dismiss the machine theory, therefore, is the same as to give up the attempt of a mechanical theory of these phenomena altogether. [This is the step of the argument in which many critics refuse to follow him.] . . . There is some agent at work in morphogenesis which is not of the type of physico-chemical agents/

Then, referring to the facts of heredity and genetics he writes : [f] Though there are material units transferred from one generation to the next, on which the realization of inheritance depends, though we know that these material conditions are localized in thenucleusinparticular, these material conditions are *not the main thing.* Some agent that *arranges* is required, and this arranging agent in inheritance cannot be of a machine-like, physico-chemical character.'

Then, after discussing actions, instinctive and intelligent, and insisting on their teleological nature, he writes : [c] Entelechy is something that is non-physico-chemical; and the only positive character we are entitled to attribute to it, so far, is that it is an actual elementary agent or factor of *Nature** He is loth to say that it is of psychical nature. [c] The contrary of *mechanical* is merely *non-mechanical,,* and not " psychical".' Here, as I have indicated elsewhere, I venture to think Driesch makes a mistake—namely, in not making the teleological nature of entelechy's activities its leading positive character; for, as was said on an earlier page, we can no longer define the mechanical save as the non-teleological. Nor

is entelechy [f] a species of so-called energy. For,' as he insists,[(] energy is nothing but a *measurement of causality in space.* How could arrangement and arranging [the functions of entelechy] be measured ?' He is of the opinion also that